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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
ALICE LITTLE,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
vs.
R. H. McMASTER,
Defendant/Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. 900090
[Priority 14b]
DC CV-221988

)

RESPONDENT R. H. McMASTER'S BRIEF

JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 78-2-2(3)(j) (1989).
The final order appealed from in this matter is the trial
court's Summary Judgment ruling (dated February 13, 1990)
dismissing the plaintiff's Complaint.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
The issues on appeal pertinent to the Supreme Court's
review of the propriety of the trial court's summary judgment
ruling are:
1.

Whether the plaintiff's deposition testimony

reveals that she is unable to state a prima facie case

of lack of informed consent against Dr. R. H. McMaster under
Utah Code § 78-14-5(1).
2.

Whether the Affidavit of Dr. Steven Shirts

can be read to create an issue of fact in this case.
3.

Whether Dr. R. H. McMaster's statutory

defense to the plaintiff's lack of informed consent claim,
under Utah Code § 78-14-5(2), mandated dismissal of the
plaintiff's Complaint.

PERTINENT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES
Utah Code Annotated § 78-14-5 (1976) (attached as
Addendum "A") contains the statutory provisions that mandated
the trial court's summary judgment dismissal of the
plaintiff's Complaint.

The case of C. S. v. Nielson, 767

P.2d 504 (Utah 1988) is not pertinent to any issue on appeal
because the respondent and appellant agree that an action for
wrongful birth exists under Utah law.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Action.
The above-captioned lawsuit is a medical malpractice

action based upon the appellant's allegation that Dr. R. H.
McMaster failed to obtain the appellant's informed consent
prior to performing a tubal ligation on the appellant on May 2,
1985.

Mrs. Little maintains that her informed consent was not
-2-

given because she allegedly was never told there was a chance
she could become pregnant despi * *.-• saving had the tubal ligation
surgery.

After taking the appellant's deposition during the

discovery proceedings below,
Motion for Summary J udgmen-

McMaster's counsel filed a
* e groui ids tl 1a t Mrs

I .i ttl e was

unable to state a prima facie case of lack of Informed
consent under the requirements set forth i11 IJtah Code Annotated
§ 78-14-5 (1976)

The trial court agreed with the respondent's

summary judgment argument and entered an Order dismissing the
appellant's Complaint on or about February 13, 1990.
The appellant assigns error to the trial court's
Summary Judgment ruling because she maintains that Dr, Steven
Shir

Affidavit creates an issue of material fact in this

case.

The appellant is mistaken in advancing this argument

because her deposition testimony, as well as the insufficiency
of Dr. Shirts' Affidavit, make it amply c :••.,; that the
appellant cannot assert a prima facie case of lack of
informed consent in the present action.

B

Statement of Facts.
Medical Treatment
On May 2, 1985, Alice Little underwent surgery for

C-section delivery - *

••'»- twins at - -Yiy Der* fluspit.il,

(Record on appeal at , -

*M

Immediately following the

delivery, Dr. McMaster performed a tubal ligation on the
-3-

plaintiff.
(R. 22.)

(Affidavit of Dr. McMaster, Addendum "B.")
The tubal ligation was accomplished using the

Pomeroy method which involves excising a loop of each
fallopian tube.

(Operative Report, Addendum " C " )

(R. 22.)

Segments of the excised fallopian tubes were sent to the
hospital laboratory.
(R. 22.)

(Pathology Report, Addendum

!I

D.I!)

Mrs. Little does not contend in this case that

Dr. McMaster failed to exercise the appropriate level of care
in performing the tubal ligation procedure. (R. 1.)
Prior to the C-section and ligation surgeries,
Mrs. Little signed a Consent to Sterilization form which
authorized Dr. McMaster to perform the tubal ligation.
(Consent form, Addendum

fI

E.fl) (R. 2 2.)

The Consent to

Sterilization form states, in part, that:
I [Alice Little] have asked for and
received information concerning
sterilization from Dr. McMaster.

I understand that the sterilization must be
considered permanent and not reversible.
I have decided that I do not want to
become pregnant or bear children, but
understand that the results from this
procedure cannot be guaranteed.

The discomforts, risks and benefits
associated with the operation have been
explained to me. All my questions have
been answered to my satisfaction.

-4-

Mrs.

Little also signed a form entitled Consent to

Operation, Anesthetics, ai id Other Medical Services (at bached as
Addendum "F") (R, 22) prior to the C-section and ligation
surgeries.

This second consent form states, in part, that:
The nature and purpose of the operation,
possible alternative methods of treatment,
the risks involved, and the possibility of
complications have been fully explained to
me.
No guarantee or assurance has been
given by anyone as to the results that may
be obtained.
Dr.

McMaster made no written guarantee, warranty,

contract or assurance of result to Alice Little concerning the
tubal ligation.

(Plaintiff's Answer to Defendant McMaster's

Interrogatory No. 2 4, August
Dr.

:

1985, Addendum "G.") (R. 2 2.)

McMastei: ma :i i itains 11 I a t i.*. •- * -;- [. 3 inec:i t o M r s - T, i * t i c

to the tubal ligation procedure that there was no way \ <>
guarantee that the procedure would prevent pregnancy.
(Addendum "r,. " ) < U , .v,.)
The medical records generated at the time Mrs. Little
was about to undergo the C-section delivery of her twins
indicate that she was "alert and responsive/1 that her vital
signs were "stal )] e,"

that she was "comfortable" and that she

had only had a local epidural block just prior to the time that
she signed the two Consent forms attached as Addendum "E1" and
Addendum "F." t
pialnti ff did

:

-

AS the medical records demonstrate, the

' :. ^ceive a general anesthetic or any other

-5-

i.rior

narcotic medication in connection with the delivery of her
twins.

(See Records at Addendum "H.") (R. 29.)
Mrs. Little became pregnant in January 198 6, and

subsequently gave birth to her fifth child in Montana, with the
assistance of Dr. Charles B. Ludden.

(Complaint, para. 9.)

(R. 1.)

Litigation
On May 2, 1988, Mrs. Little filed suit against the
defendants, Dr. McMaster and McKay Dee Hospital.
(R. 1.)
Mrs. Little stated in her deposition, taken on
January 11, 1989, that at the time she requested Dr. McMaster
to perform the fallopian tubal ligation procedure, she was
aware of at least one woman who had become pregnant after
having undergone a tubal ligation.

(Plaintiff's Deposition,

p. 32, at Addendum "I.") (R. 29.)

The appellant said she was

"scared that [what happened to the Evanston woman] could
happen11 to her following the tubal ligation Dr. McMaster was
to perform.

(Id. p. 33) (R. 29.)

Mrs. Little also stated in

her deposition that had Dr. McMaster told her (as he insists
he did) that she could become pregnant after her tubal ligation
surgery, she would have readily consented to the surgery
anyway.

(Plaintiff's Deposition, p. 72, at Addendum "1.")

(R. 29)
-6-

Based on the appellant's deposition testimony,
Dr. McMaster's counsel filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on
April 4, 1989. (R. 22.)

The grounds for the motion were

(1) that the plaintiff was not able to state a prima facie
case of lack of informed consent, under Utah Code § 78-14-5
(197 6 ) , because she admitted in her deposition that she would
have had the tubal ligation performed whether or not she had
been fully informed that she might become pregnant following
the ligation, (2) the plaintiff had failed to come forward with
expert testimony which stated that Dr. McMaster had not
complied with the applicable standard of care, and
(3) Dr. McMaster's statutory defense, arising from the signed
Consent to Sterilization form, precluded the plaintiff's claim
as a matter of law.
In response to Dr. McMaster's Motion for Summary
Judgment, Alice Little's counsel came forward with the
affidavit of Dr. Steven Shirts (attached as Addendum "J.")
(R. 32.)

In his affidavit, Dr. Shirts asserts that (1) the

Consent to Sterilization form signed by Mrs. Little is
inherently unclear "to the average layman," (2) Mrs. Little
would not have been competent to sign the Consent to
Sterilization form if she had received any kind of narcotic
within one or two hours prior to signing the form,
(3) Dr. McMaster should have told Mrs. Little that chances of
pregnancy decrease from 1 in 125 to 1 in 3 00 if a tubal
-7-

ligation is performed six weeks post delivery; and (4) Alice
Little apparently signed the Consent to Sterilization form
just shortly before her C-section.

Based on these assertions,

Dr. Shirts concluded that Dr. McMaster fell below the
requisite standard of care in failing to obtain Mrs. Little's
informed consent to the ligation surgery.
During his deposition taken on August 14, 1989,
Dr. Shirts retracted significant portions of his affidavit
testimony. (R. 130.)

Dr. Shirts conceded in his deposition

that, "I believe that the patient [Alice Little] received an
epidural anesthesia, which is appropriate anesthesia for the
surgery that is to be performed.

Regional anesthesia, where

you block a certain area of the body, I do not believe has been
associated with negating one patient's ability to sign informed
consent."

(Dr. Shirts' deposition at p. 52.) (R. 130.)

Dr. Shirts also conceded, in his deposition, that the statement
in his affidavit which reads, "it appears that the obtaining of
Alice Little's signature on the Consent was done at the last
minute," was a statement that should be stricken from the
affidavit.

Dr. Shirts wanted the statement stricken because,

as he stated, "as time has gone by, I've come to understand
things better; I do not know if that's a true statement or
not."

(Dr. Shirts' deposition at p. 68.) (R. 130.)
Following a January 29, 1990 hearing on

Dr. McMaster's Motion for Summary Judgment, Judge Stanton
-8-

Taylor granted the Motion from the bench.

Judge Taylor's

Summary Judgment Order was subsequently signed on February 13,
1990. (R. 42.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
In her Complaint, Alice Little alleges that Dr. R. H.
McMaster did not obtain informed consent to a tubal
ligation operation performed on the appellant because the
doctor allegedly never told Mrs. Little that she could become
pregnant following the operation.

The appellant's claim of

lack of informed consent fails as a matter of law because the
appellant has admitted in her deposition testimony that a
critical element of her statutorily defined claim is lacking in
this case.

Specifically, the appellant has admitted that the

statutory prerequisite to bringing a claim for lack of informed
consent contained in Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-5(1)(f) (1976) does
not exist under the facts of this case.

Mrs. Little

unequivocally stated in her deposition that she would have
authorized the tubal ligation performed by Dr. McMaster
regardless of whether she had been informed that she could
become pregnant following the ligation procedure.

This

admission by the appellant clearly destroys any lack of
informed consent action the appellant may wish to bring against
Dr. McMaster in connection with the tubal ligation surgery.

-9-

Faced with the admission, the trial court had no choice but to
enter an order summarily dismissing the plaintiff's Complaint.
The plaintiff's sole argument on appeal is that the
trial court erred in entering its summary judgment order
because the affidavit of Dr. Steven Shirts creates an issue of
fact in this case.

The appellant's contention is incorrect for

two reasons.
First, Dr. Shirts' affidavit cannot give life to a
lack of informed consent claim which the appellant has already
admitted does not exist.

Alice Little has acknowledged in her

deposition that the statutorily mandated element under Utah
Code Ann. § 78-14-5(1)(f) is absent from this case because she
admits she would have had the tubal ligation performed
following her C-section even if Dr. McMaster had told her the
procedure could not be guaranteed to prevent future pregnancy.
This admission renders any affidavit opinion expressed by
Dr. Shirts moot and irrelevant.

Dr. Shirts cannot say that the

plaintiff would have withheld her consent to the tubal ligation
when Mrs. Little has already admitted just the opposite.
Dr. Shirts' affidavit can only come into play in this case once
the plaintiff has cleared the hurdle of asserting a
prima facia case under Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-5 (1976).
The Utah Supreme Court should conclude that Dr. Shirts'
affidavit cannot be utilized to raise an issue of fact in a
case which the plaintiff has admitted does not exist.
-10-

Second, Dr. Shirts' affidavit, on its face, does not
give rise to an issue of fact because the affidavit does not
contain a Rule 702 expert opinion pertinent to the informed
consent issue in this case.

When Dr. Shirts concludes in his

affidavit that the consent to sterilization form signed by the
plaintiff is too ambiguous to be understood by a lay person,
Dr. Shirts is not bringing any specialized medical training or
background to bear in rendering the opinion.

Dr. Shirts'

observations regarding the clarity of the language in the
consent to sterilization form are no more persuasive or helpful
than the trial court's opinion or any lay juror's opinion might
be on the issue of the clarity of the form.

The trial court

properly rejected Dr. Shirts' opinion regarding the ambiguity
in the language of the consent form because Dr. Shirts was
obviously not speaking as an expert when he made his
observation regarding the consent form's language.
Additionally, Dr. Shirts' categorical opinion that
Mrs. Little would not have been "competent" to sign the Consent
to Sterilization form if she signed it within one or two hours
after receiving any narcotic medication is pure speculation,
and this opinion runs directly counter to all of the hospital
medical records (including the carefully and neatly signed
Consent Form itself) which indicate that Mrs. Little was
"alert," "responsive," awake and "comfortable" at the time she
signed the form.

Dr. Shirts acknowledged in his deposition
-11-

that the epidural block administered to Mrs. Little prior to
the time she signed the two Consent forms would not have
impaired her competency to sign the forms.
For these two reasons, Dr. Shirts' affidavit cannot
be read to give rise to an issue of fact in this case.

Since

the appellant's sole contention in her Supreme Court brief is
that a remand is appropriate because Dr. Shirts' affidavit
gives rise to an issue of fact, the appellant's requested
relief must be denied.
Finally, even if the Mrs. Little has presented
sufficient evidence to state a prima facie case of lack of
informed consent, her claim was properly dismissed on the
grounds that Dr. McMaster is protected from the claim as a
matter of law by his statutory defenses.

The Summary Judgment

ruling entered below should be upheld on appeal.
A R G U M E N T
POINT I

THE TRIAL COURT'PROPERLY GRANTED
THE DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT.
As this Court reviews the trial court's summary
judgment ruling, the appellant is entitled to have all the
facts presented, and all the inferences fairly arising
therefrom, considered in the light most favorable to her lack
of informed consent claim.

Geneva Pipe Co. v. S&H Ins. Co.,
-12-

714 P.2d 648 (Utah 1986).

Since a summary judgment ruling is

granted as a matter of law rather than as a matter of fact, the
Supreme Court reviews the trial court's legal conclusions for
correctness, without according deference to those legal
conclusions.
1989).

Bonham v. Morgan, 788 P.2d 497 (Utah

As the United States Supreme Court has pointed out,

however, summary judgment procedure should not be regarded as a
disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather as an integral part
of the Rules of Civil Procedure as a whole, "which are designed
to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of
every action."

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,

106 S. Ct. 2548, 91 L. Ed. 2d. 265, 276 (1986).

The trial

court's summary judgment ruling in the present case should be
upheld on appeal because the trial court properly determined
that Alice Little is unable to state a claim of lack of
informed consent against Dr. R. H. McMaster under Utah's
informed consent statute.
A. The Plaintiff's Deposition Testimony Demonstrates That
The Plaintiff Cannot State A Claim Against Dr. McMaster
For Lack Of Informed Consent Under Utah Code S 78-14-5.
The sufficiency of a claim of lack of informed
consent asserted by a plaintiff in Utah is governed by Utah
Code Ann. § 78-14-5 (1976):
(1) When a person submits to health care
rendered by a health care provider, it
shall be presumed that what the health care
provider did was either expressly or
-13-

impliedly authorized to be done. For a
patient to recover damages from a health
care provider in an action based upon the
provider's failure to obtain informed
consent, the patient must prove the
following:
(a) That a provider-patient
relationship existed between the
patient and health care provider; and
(b) the health care provider rendered
health care to the patient; and
(c) the patient suffered personal
injuries arising out of the health
care rendered; and
(d) the health care rendered carried
with it a substantial and significant
risk of causing the patient serious
harm; and
(e) the patient was not informed of
the substantial and significant risk;
and
(f) a reasonable, prudent person in
the patient's position would not have
consented to the health care rendered
after having been fully informed as to
all facts relevant to the decision to
give consent. In determining what a
reasonable, prudent person in the
patient's position would do under the
circumstances, the finder of fact
shall use the viewpoint of the
patient before health care was
provided and before the occurrence of
any personal injuries alleged to have
arisen from said health care; and
(g) the unauthorized part of the
health care rendered was the proximate
cause of personal injuries suffered by
the patient. (Emphasis added.)

-14-

It is undisputed that in order to make out a prima facie
case under this section, a plaintiff must be able to prove
all of the above-quoted statutory elements.

Ramon v.

Farr, 770 P.2d 131 (Utah 1989); Burton v. Youncrblood,
711 P.2d 245, 249 (Utah 1985).

Without such proof, a plaintiff

has no basis for asserting or attempting to advance an action
for failure to obtain informed consent.

Id.

In the present

case, there is no way that the plaintiff will be able to prove
her claim of lack of informed consent because the plaintiff has
admitted in her deposition that an essential element of her
prima facia case cannot be established.
Under § 78-14-5(1)(f) of the above-quoted statute,
the appellant must prove that a person in her position, and
with her "viewpoint," would not have consented to the tubal
ligation surgery she underwent had that person been apprised of
the fact that the tubal ligation procedure could not be
guaranteed to prevent subsequent pregnancy.

This element of

Mrs. Little's prima facia case is clearly absent because
she has admitted without hesitation in her deposition that if
Dr. McMaster had told her (as Dr. McMaster insists he did)
that the results from the tubal ligation procedure could not be
guaranteed, she would nevertheless have gone forward with the
procedure.

(Plaintiff's Deposition at p. 72.)

Mrs. Little

also admitted that she knew, prior to the tubal ligation

-15-

performed by Dr. McMaster, of at least one woman who had
become pregnant following a tubal ligation operation:
(by Mr. Stott) Did you have
friends, girl friends who had their
tubes cut and then got pregnant?
(by Alice Little) No, just — I
heard of a case in Evanston where a
lady got pregnant after her tubes
were cut for five years.
Did you hear about that before your
tubes had been cut?
Yes.

Q.

So you knew it could happen, didn't
you?

A.

I was scared it could happen.

Q.

It was your understanding before
you had your tubes cut that — you
were aware that pregnancy could
happen, even though your tubes had
been cut; correct?

A.

I was scared that my chances
that it was a possibility.

Q.

If Dr. McMaster had told you that
the results from the procedure
could not be guaranteed, as stated
in [the Consent to Sterilization
form], would you still have wanted
the tubal ligation?

A.

Yes, but I would have went on and
had my husband fixed.

—

(Plaintiff's Depo. at pp. 32-33 and 72.) (Addendum "I.")

-16-

Given these admissions, and the clear requirement
under § 78-14-5(1)(f), Mrs. Little has no claim of lack of
informed consent.

The appellant knew it was possible to become

pregnant after a tubal ligation, and she would have had
Dr. McMaster perform the ligation on May 2, 1985 whether or
not he guaranteed against any future pregnancies.

The fact

that Mrs. Little may have encouraged her husband to undergo a
sterilization procedure if she had had uncertainties about the
effectiveness of the tubal ligation operation is irrelevant to
her claim of lack of informed consent because she has admitted
she would have had the procedure whether or not it was
guaranteed to prevent pregnancy.
B. Dr. Stevens Shirts7 Affidavit Submitted by The Plaintiff
Does Not Create An Issue of Fact In This Case.
Mrs. Little's sole argument on appeal is that the
trial court erred in entering its summary judgment order
because the affidavit of Dr. Steven Shirts creates an issue of
material fact in this case.

Dr. Shirts' affidavit states that

Dr. McMaster fell below the requisite standard of care in
failing to obtain Mrs. Little's informed consent to the tubal
ligation because (1) the Consent to Sterilization form is
unclear to the average layman; (2) Dr. McMaster may not have
told the plaintiff that the chances of pregnancy would have
decreased from 1 in 125 to 1 in 300 if the tubal ligation would
have been performed more than six weeks after the C-section
-17-

operation, (3) Alice Little was not competent to sign the
Consent to Sterilization form if she had received any narcotic
one or two hours prior to the time she signed the form, and
(4) Mrs. Little apparently signed the two consent forms very
quickly just before surgery.

The appellant's contention that

this affidavit gives rise to an issue of fact is incorrect for
two reasons.

1.
First, Dr. Shirts' affidavit cannot give life to a
lack of informed consent claim which the appellant has
previously admitted does not exist.

Mrs. Little admitted she

would have had the tubal ligation whether or not she was told
that she could become pregnant following the procedure!
(Addendum "I.")

When the appellant acknowledged in her

deposition testimony that the statutorily mandated element
under Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-5(1)(f) does not exist in this
case, she rendered any affidavit opinion expressed by
Dr. Shirts moot and irrelevant.

There is no way that any of

the contentions made in Dr. Shirts' affidavit can be read to
counteract Mrs. Little's admission that she would have gone
forward with the tubal ligation on May 2, 1985 had
Dr. McMaster told her (as he insists he did) that there was
no guarantee she would not become pregnant following the
procedure.

Clearly, Dr. Shirts' affidavit can only come into
-18-

play in this case (on the issue of whether Dr. McMaster met
the relevant standard of care) once the plaintiff has succeeded
in asserting a prima facia case under Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-14-5 (1976).

As in any other medical malpractice case,

expert opinion on the standard of care in a lack of informed
consent case only becomes relevant after the plaintiff is able
to point to a compensable injury or harm.
P.2d 131 (Utah 1989).

Ramon v. Farr, 770

Alice Little has admitted in this action

that no such compensable injury or harm exists because she has
stated in her deposition that she would have had the tubal
ligation procedure performed whether or not Dr. McMaster
could have guaranteed that the procedure would have prevented
future pregnancy.
This Court should recognize that Utah's informed
consent statute, Utah Code § 78-14-5 et seq., was designed
to impose a somewhat significant burden upon plaintiffs who
desire to assert a lack of informed consent claim.

By the same

token, the statute affords health care providers some degree of
shelter from the heavy volume of medical malpractice claims
being filed in court today.

Indeed, the very first sentence of

the informed consent statute states that "when a person
submits to health care rendered by a health care provider, it
shall be presumed that what the health care provider did was
either expressly or impliedly authorized to be done."

By

requiring a plaintiff to make an affirmative showing of each of
-19-

these seven elements contained in § 78-14-5, the Utah
Legislature has carefully established the prima facie
showing that must be made before the presumption of adequate
informed consent can be overcome.

Because of her party

admission in the present case, Alice Little has failed to make
the prima facie showing which is a prerequisite to allowing
her lack of informed consent claim to proceed to trial.
Mrs. Little cannot be allowed to utilize the affidavit
testimony of Dr. Steven Shirts as the source for a vital fact
which she has already admitted does not exist.
Dr. Shirts7 belief that Dr. McMaster should have
informed Mrs. Little that her chances of becoming pregnant
would have been 1 in 3 00 if she had had the tubal ligation
performed six weeks after her C-section delivery does not
create an issue of fact in this case for one simple reason.
Before Dr. Shirts7 opinion regarding whether Dr. McMaster
should have told Mrs. Little about the statistical
probabilities can become relevant in this case, Mrs. Little
must affirmatively show that she would not have had the tubal
ligation performed had she been told about the statistical
probabilities prior to the C-section delivery.

Mrs. Little

clearly has not met this threshold burden imposed by
§ 78-14-5(1)(f) because she has admitted that she would have
had the ligation performed despite having had any information
from Dr. McMaster regarding the probability that she could
-20-

become pregnant in the future.

Accordingly, Dr. Shirts'

opinion expressed in paragraph five of his affidavit has been
rendered moot and irrelevant by Mrs. Little's party admission.
This Court should conclude that Dr. Shirts' affidavit cannot be
utilized to raise an issue of fact in a case which the
plaintiff has admitted does not exist.

2.
Second, Dr. Shirts' affidavit, on its face, does not
give rise to an issue of fact in this case because the
affidavit does not contain a Rule 702 expert opinion pertinent
to the informed consent issue in this case.

It is well settled

in this jurisdiction that expert testimony is relevant to a
case, and will be allowed into evidence, only when the
testimony is helpful in assisting a trier of fact with
deliberation upon a technical issue beyond the ken of the fact
finder.

Rule 702, Utah Rules of Evidence.

The matter of

ruling upon the qualification of an expert witness lies in the
discretion of the trial court.

State v. Locke, 688 P.2d

464 (Utah 1984).
When Dr. Shirts concludes in his affidavit that the
Consent to Sterilization form signed by the plaintiff is too
ambiguous to be understood by a lay person, Dr. Shirts is not
bringing any specialized medical training or background to bear
in rendering the opinion.

Dr. Shirts' opinion regarding the
-21-

clarity of the language in the Consent to Sterilization form is
no more persuasive or helpful than the trial court's opinion or
any lay juror's opinion might be on the issue of the clarity of
the form.

The trial court properly rejected Dr. Shirts'

opinion regarding the ambiguity in the language of the consent
form because Dr. Shirts was obviously not speaking as an expert
when he made his observation regarding the consent form's
language.
Further, the court below properly rejected much of
Dr. Shirts' affidavit because of its speculative and unfounded
conclusions.

Dr. Shirts' opinion that Alice Little would not

have been competent to sign the Consent to Sterilization form
if she had received any narcotic within one or two hours of
signing the form was rendered nonsensical by all of the
hospital medical records generated in this case that indicated
at the time Mrs. Little signed the Consent to Sterilization
form (following an epidural block) she was alert, responsive,
awake and comfortable.
Addendum

fl

H.lf)

(See the Medical Records attached at

The trial court properly determined that the

conjectural nature of Dr. Shirts' "competency" opinion mandated
that such an opinion could not be submitted to a trier of fact
under the standards set forth in Rule 7 02 of the Utah Rules of
Evidence.

Dr. Shirts conceded in his deposition that "I

believe that the patient received an epidural anesthesia, which
is appropriate anesthesia for the surgery that is to be
-22-

performed.

Regional anesthesia, where you block a certain

area of the body, I do not believe has been associated with
ligatincr one patient's ability to sign an Informed Consent."
(Dr. Shirts' deposition at p. 52.)
Dr. Shirts also stated, in his deposition, that the
statement in his affidavit indicating "it appears that the
obtaining of Alice Little's signature on the Consent was done
at the last minute11 was a statement that should be stricken
from the affidavit.

Dr. Shirts wanted the statement stricken

because, as he stated, "as time has gone by, I've come to
understand things better, I do not know if that's a true
statement or not."

(Dr. Shirts' deposition at p. 68.)

For the two reasons outlined above, Dr. Shirts'
affidavit cannot be read to give rise to an issue of fact in
this case.

Since the appellant's sole contention in her

Supreme Court brief is that a remand is appropriate because
Dr. Shirts' affidavit gives rise to an issue of fact, the
appellant's requested relief must be denied.

-23-

POINT II
EVEN IF THE PLAINTIFF HAS PRESENTED
SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO MAKE OUT A PRIMA FACIA
CASE OF LACK OF INFORMED CONSENT, THE PLAINTIFF'S
CLAIM STILL FAILS AS A MATTER OF LAW BECAUSE OF
DR. McMASTER'S STATUTORY DEFENSES.
Under Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-5(2) (1976):
It shall be a defense to any malpractice
action against a health care provider
based upon alleged failure to obtain
informed consent if:
e. The patient or his representative
executed a written consent which sets
forth the nature and purpose of the
intended health care and which
contains a declaration that the
patient accepts the risk of
substantial and serious harm, if any,
in hopes of obtaining desired
beneficial results of health care and
which acknowledges that health care
providers involved have explained his
condition and the proposed health care
in a satisfactory manner and that all
questions asked about the health care
and its attendant risks have been
answered in a manner satisfactory to
the patient or his representative;
such written consent shall be a
defense to an action against a health
care provider based upon failure to
obtain informed consent unless the
patient proves that the person giving
the consent lacked capacity to consent
or shows by clear and convincing proof
that the execution of the written
consent was induced by the defendant's
affirmative acts of fraudulent
misrepresentation or fraudulent
omission to state material facts.
(Emphasis added.)
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Not only did the trial court properly dismiss the
plaintiff's action as a matter of law under § 78-14-5(1) (f) ,
but the action was also properly dismissed because the
plaintiff executed a written consent pursuant to
§ 78-14-5(2)(e).

The two consent forms (attached as Addendum

"E" and Addendum "F") establish in black and white that
Dr. McMaster has a very powerful statutory defense to the
appellant's claim under § 78-14-5(2) (e) .

The consent forms

contain every element of the written consent defense that is
required in the above-quoted statute.

Once these consent forms

were advanced by Dr. McMaster, § 78-14-5(2)(e) shifted the
burden to the appellant to prove that the written consent
defense could somehow be avoided.

The appellant made no

attempt during the Summary Judgment proceedings below to show
how the written consent defense could be overcome.
The appellant does not pretend in this action that a
written consent defense may be avoided on the basis that
Dr. McMaster committed any affirmative act of fraudulent
misrepresentation or because Dr. McMaster fraudulently
omitted to state material facts.

Such contentions have never

been advanced by Mrs. Little in this case.

Furthermore, any

claim by the plaintiff that she lacked capacity to consent is
futile in this case.

The medical records generated at the time

the plaintiff executed the written consent indicate that she
was "alert and responsive," that her vital signs were "stable"
-25-

and that she was "comfortable."
hereto as Addendum "H.")

(See Medical Record attached

The plaintiff's own expert,

Dr. Steven Shirts, has admitted that the local epidural block
administered to Mrs. Little likely did not affect her ability
to read, understand and sign the two consent forms quoted on
pages four and five above.

(Dr. Shirts' deposition at p. 52.)

All of the evidence in this case indicates that Mrs. Little's
capacity to read, to understand what she was reading, and to
sign her name were all fully intact at the time she executed
the written consents attached as Addendum "E" and Addendum
"F."

The plaintiff has come forward with no evidence upon

which to base a claim that she was not competent to read,
understand and sign the consent forms at issue.

CONCLUSION
The appellant's lack of informed consent claim
against Dr. McMaster was properly dismissed on the grounds
that Mrs. Little has failed to come forward with evidence
sufficient to make out her prima facie case under Utah
Code § 78-14-5.

The affidavit of Dr. Steven Shirts is wholly

insufficient to give rise to an issue of material fact in a
case the appellant has admitted does not exist.

Even if

Mrs. Little has presented sufficient evidence to state a
prima facie case of lack of informed consent, her claim was
properly dismissed on the grounds that Dr. McMaster is
-26-

protected from the claim as a matter of law by his statutory
defenses.

The Summary Judgment ruling entered below should be

upheld on appeal.
DATED this

/ /

day of September, 199 0.
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER
& NELSON

Gary
Michael A. Peterson
Attorneys for Respondent
Robert H. McMaster, M.D.
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that four true and correct copies
of the foregoing instrument were mailed, first class, postage
prepaid this /^ day of September, 1990, to the following
counsel of record:
Mary C. Corporon, Esq.
CORPORON & WILLIAMS
Suite 1100 - Boston Building
#9 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Plaintiff

•MLJLJ!
LITTL/B/MPW
83190
9818-012
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tal, medical, dental, or other health care services, except benefits received
as gifts, contributions, or assistance made gratuitously; and
(d) any contractual or voluntary wage continuation plan provided by
employers or any other system intended to provide wages during a period
of disability.
(3) To preserve subrogation rights for amounts paid or received prior to
settlement or judgment, a provider of collateral sources shall serve at least 30
days before settlement or trial of the action a written notice upon each health
care provider against whom the malpractice action has been asserted. The
written notice shall state the name and address of the provider of collateral
sources, the amount of collateral sources paid, the names and addresses of all
persons who received payment, and the items and purposes for which payment
has been made.
(4) Evidence is admissible of government programs that provide payments
or benefits available in the future to or for the benefit of the plaintiff to the
extent available irrespective of the recipient's ability to pay. Evidence of the
likelihood or unlikelihood that such programs, payments, or benefits will be
available in the future is also admissible. The trier of fact may consider such
evidence in determining the amount of damages awarded to a plaintiff for
future expenses.
(5) No provider of collateral sources is entitled to recover the amounts of
such benefits from a health care provider, the plaintiff, or any other person or
entity as reimbursement for collateral source payments made prior to settlement or judgment, including any payments made under Chapter 19, Title 26,
except to the extent that subrogation rights to amounts paid prior to settlement or judgment are preserved as provided in this section. All policies of
insurance providing benefits affected by this section are construed in accordance with this section.
History: C. 1953, 78-14-4.5, enacted by L.
1985, ch. 237, § 1.
Effective Dates. — Section 2 of Laws 1985,

ch. 237 provided: "This act takes effect on July
1, 1985."

78-14-5. Failure to obtain informed consent — Proof required of patient — Defenses — Consent to health
care.
(1) When a person submits to health care rendered by a health care provider, it shall be presumed that what the health care provider did was either
expressly or impliedly authorized to be done. For a patient to recover damages
from a health care provider in an action based upon the provider's failure to
obtain informed consent, the patient must prove the following:
(a) that a provider-patient relationship existed between the patient
and health care provider; and
(b) the health care provider rendered health care to the patient; and
(c) the patient suffered personal injuries arising out of the health care
rendered; and
(d) the health care rendered carried with it a substantial and significant risk of causing the patient serious harm; and
(e) the patient was not informed of the substantial and significant risk;
and
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tal, medical, dental, or other health care services, except benefits received
as gifts, contributions, or assistance made gratuitously; and
(d) any contractual or voluntary wage continuation plan provided by
employers or any other system intended to provide wages during a period
of disability.
(3) To preserve subrogation rights for amounts paid or received prior to
settlement or judgment, a provider of collateral sources shall serve at least 30
days before settlement or trial of the action a written notice upon each health
care provider against whom the malpractice action has been asserted. The
written notice shall state the name and address of the provider of collateral
sources, the amount of collateral sources paid, the names and addresses of all
persons who received payment, and the items and purposes for which payment
has been made.
(4) Evidence is admissible of government programs that provide payments
or benefits available in the future to or for the benefit of the plaintiff to the
extent available irrespective of the recipient's ability to pay. Evidence of the
likelihood or unlikelihood that such programs, payments, or benefits will be
available in the future is also admissible. The trier of fact may consider such
evidence in determining the amount of damages awarded to a plaintiff for
future expenses.
(5) No provider of collateral sources is entitled to recover the amounts of
such benefits from a health care provider, the plaintiff, or any other person or
entity as reimbursement for collateral source payments made prior to settlement or judgment, including any payments made under Chapter 19, Title 26,
except to the extent that subrogation rights to amounts paid prior to settlement or judgment are preserved as provided in this section. All policies of
insurance providing benefits affected by this section are construed in accordance with this section.
History: C. 1953, 78-14-4.5, enacted by L.
1985, ch. 237, § 1.
Effective Dates. — Section 2 of Laws 1985,

ch. 237 provided: 'This act takes effect on July
1, 1985."

78-14-5. Failure to obtain informed consent — Proof required of patient — Defenses — Consent to health
care.
(1) When a person submits to health care rendered,by a health care provider, it shall be presumed that what the health care provider did was either
expressly or impliedly authorized to be done. For a patient to recover damages
from a health care provider in an action based upon the provider's failure to
obtain informed consent, the patient must prove the following:
(a) that a provider-patient relationship existed between the patient
and health care provider; and
(b) the health care provider rendered health care to the patient; and
(c) the patient suffered personal injuries arising out of the health care
rendered; and
(d) the health care rendered carried with it a substantial and significant risk of causing the patient serious harm; and
(e) the patient was not informed of the substantial and significant risk;
and
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(f) a reasonable, prudent person in the patient's position would not
have consented to the health care rendered after having been fully informed as to all facts relevant to the decision to give consent. In determining what a reasonable, prudent person in the patient's position would do
under the circumstances, the finder of fact shall use the viewpoint of the
patient before health care was provided and before the occurrence of any
personal injuries alleged to have arisen from said health care; and
(g) the unauthorized part of the health care rendered was the proximate cause of personal injuries suffered by the patient.
(2) It shall be a defense to any malpractice action against a health care
provider based upon alleged failure to obtain informed consent if:
(a) the risk of the serious harm which the patient actually suffered was
relatively minor; or
(b) the risk of serious harm to the patient from the health care provider
was commonly known to the public; or
(c) the patient stated, prior to receiving the health care complained of,
that he would accept the health care involved regardless of the risk; or
that he did not want to be informed of the matters to which he would be
entitled to be informed; or
(d) the health care provider, after considering all of the attendant facts
and circumstances, used reasonable discretion as to the manner and extent to which risks were disclosed, if the health care provider reasonably
believed that additional disclosures could be expected to have a substantial and adverse effect on the patient's condition; or
(e) the patient or his representative executed a written consent which
sets forth the nature and purpose of the intended health care and which
contains a declaration that the patient accepts the risk of substantial and
serious harm, if any, in hopes of obtaining desired beneficial results of
health care and which acknowledges that health care providers involved
have explained his condition and the proposed health care in a satisfactory manner and that all questions asked about the health care and its
attendant risks have been answered in a manner satisfactory to the patient or his representative; such written consent shall be a defense to an
action against a health care provider based upon failure to obtain informed consent unless the patient proves that the person giving the consent lacked capacity to consent or shows by clear and convincing proof
that the execution of the written consent was induced by the defendant's
affirmative acts of fraudulent misrepresentation or fraudulent omission
to state material facts.
(3) Nothing contained in this act shall be construed to prevent any person
eighteen years of age or over from refusing to consent to health care for his
own person upon personal or religious grounds.
(4) The following persons are authorized and empowered to consent to any
health care not prohibited by law:
(a) any parent, whether an adult or a minor, for his minor child;
(b) any married person, for a spouse;
(c) any person temporarily standing in loco parentis, whether formally
serving or not, for the minor under his care and any guardian for his
ward;
(d) any person eighteen years of age or over for his or her parent who is
unable by reason of age, physical or mental condition, to provide such
consent;
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(e) any patient eighteen years of age or over;
(f) any female regardless of age or marital status, when given in connection with her pregnancy or childbirth;
(g) in the absence of a parent, any adult for his minor brother or sister;
and
(h) in the absence of a parent, any grandparent for his minor grandchild.
(5) No person who in good faith consents or authorizes health care treatment or procedures for another as provided by this act shall be subject to civil
liability.
History: L. 1976, ch. 23, § 5.
Meaning of "this act". — The phrase "this
act", referred to in Subsections (3) and (5),
means Laws 1976, Chapter 23, which enacted
this chapter and § 78-14-11 and amended
§§ 31-3-1, 31-5-21, and 78-12-28.
C r o s s - R e f e r e n c e s . — Abortion, informed
consent requirements, §§ 76-7-305, 76-7-305.5.

Blood donation by minor over eighteen, parental consent not required, § 15-2-5.
Sterilization, informed consent for procedure, § 64-10-1.
Venereal disease, minor's power to consent
to treatment, § 26-6-18.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

In general.
Pregnancy and childbirth.
—Husband's consent.
Proof required.
In g e n e r a l .
T h i s . section merely sets forth the factual
showing required for a patient to recover damages from a health care provider for failure to
obtain "informed consent," and establishes a
safe harbor for health care providers relative to
informed consent in the context of civil malpractice litigation. It does not constitute a general consent law mandating parental consent
for family planning services as well as other
kinds of medical care. Planned Parenthood
Ass'n v. Dandoy, 635 F. Supp. 184 (D. Utah
1986).

Pregnancy and childbirth.
—Husband's consent.
Where married pregnant woman is in full
possession of her faculties, she alone has the
power to submit to surgical procedures upon
herself; husband's consent to such medical procedures is not required. Reiser v. Lohner, 641
P.2d 93 (Utah 1982).
Proof required.
To make out a prima facie case of failure to
obtain informed consent, the patient must
prove all of the statutory elements in Subsection (1). Burton v. Youngblood, 711 P.2d 245
(Utah 1985).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Brigham Young Law Review. — California Supreme Court Expands the Informed Consent Doctrine; Physicians Have a Duty to Obtain an Informed Refusal: Truman v. Thomas,
1980 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 933.

Am. Jur. 2d. — 51 Am. J u r . 2d Physicians,
Surgeons, and Other Healers § 200 et seq.
C.J.S. — 70 C J . S . Physicians and Surgeons
§ 48.
Key N u m b e r s . — Physicians and Surgeons
*» 15(8), 16.
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GARY D. STOTT
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER
& NELSON
Attorneys for Respondent Robert H. McMaster, M.D.
CSB Tower, Suite 700
50 South Main Street
P.O. Box 2465
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110
Telephone: (801) 531-1777
BEFORE THE DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL AND PROFESSIONAL LICENSING
STATE OF UTAH
ALICE LITTLE,
Petitioner,
AFFIDAVIT OF
ROBERT H. MCMASTER, M.D,

vs.
R. H. MCMASTER, M.D.,
MCKAY DEE HOSPITAL,
Respondents.

Case No. PR- 87-10-035

STATE OF-ARIZONA^T/fr/V )
County of -Mztricopa£^£")
Robert H. McMaster, M.D., being first duly sworn,
deposes and says:
1.

That at all times relevant to the claims of the

petitioner as stated in the Notice of Intent to Commence
Action, I was a licensed medical doctor authorized to practice
medicine in the State of Utah.

I am Board Certified in

obstetrics and gynecology.
2.

On or about May 2, 1985, I performed a

C-section on the claimant with the delivery of twins.

3.

After the delivery, I performed a tubal ligatic

using-the Pomeroy method.

A copy of the operative report is

attached "to'the affidavit.

Within the operative report it is

stated that each tube was grasped at the mid-portion with a
Babcock.

A loop of the tube was then ligated with a plain tie,

and a portion of the loop was excised.

The attached Pathology

Report confirms that portions of each fallopian tube were
removed.
4.

Within the medical records which pertain to the

tubal ligation is a copy of a consent form which was signed by
the claimant for the sterilization procedure.

I discussed wit*

the claimant that the procedure could not be guaranteed to 1005<
eliminate a subsequent pregnancy.

Knowing that risk the

claimant proceeded with the requested tubal ligation.
5.
claimant.

On or about February 25, 198 6, I again saw the

She indicated she was pregnant with an estimated

date of confinement for October 1, 198 6.

That is the last

contact that I had with the claimant.
6.

It is my opinion that I met the standard of

care in doing the tubal ligation, and in discussing the
procedure with the claimant.

I feel that there was sufficient

discussion and information available to the claimant to
properly inform her of the consequences of the procedure and
its potential success.

I do not feel that I departed from the

standard of care in any manner.

The procedure that was used

was an accepted surgical procedure.
-2-

DATED this stf /

' day of December, 1987.

Robert H. McMaster, M.D.
P,
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this -y 7 ^" day <
AUUlt'rrUs^'Ly
1987, by Robert H. McMaster, M.D.

<^

rtCtzC;

NOTARY/PUBLIC
Residing at:

c.

a^

y

si/--^ <^^7 . -O /

S

."My Commission Expires:

K^UA^'J
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of tA
foregoing instrument was mailed, first class, postage prepaid
this
day of December, 1987, to the following counsel of
record:
Mary C. Corporon, Esq.
CORPORON & WILLIAMS
#9 Exchange Place
Suite 1100, Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Petitioner

-4-

A D D E N D U M

C

BFg

McKAY-DEE HOSPITAL CENTER

'Win

OGDEN, UTAH 84409

PREGP DIAGNOSIS;
PQSTQP DIAGNOSIS*
OPERA!ION PE«IT0R:?1ED:
SURGEON*
ANESTHESIAS

\c

'f

Repeat 1«..!/« transverse C- •••c-ci-inri and P o m e m 1
tubal 1 i gat i on.
T<,li,

»'*cf*:;••• *;t-er,

M .D .

flp i dure! 1 .

D E S C R I P T I O N G F T H E . .PRRCCnsjRCz
Under
*.a t i r>f a c t o r y .,, i nduct ion v .wit*
Epidural
anpslher*iaf
the patient wi:i,:> placed in tlie ^/pine po*• itlor
on the operating table, pr^pp^d and draped
in the usualflidr.ner.M|/
skin i nc i B i on was made lti?ourj!i the old midline incision ar«r! the subcutrineous iir>BUirr> and fa^r ir.i were i nr i sed vertically, and the per- i torin-a 1
cavity was entered
in a <vephal or audad d irection. The lower* segment
was noted to have appro>: ? mat el y a 1 cm defect with a window and
the
membranes bulging
in this window. The bladder flan wr.s incited '.c«nd
the bladder- was pushed off the lower segment.
, Scisr^rn. were taken
and
extended the window laterally arid the lower segment of the uterus
w,".is entered by using the fingers to c:tsnd the defect. The membranes
were ruptured
on the f i rst twi n. It w a s a m a l e f e t u s in t h e f r a n k
b r e e c h p o s i t i o n ri ri d w a s i! e 1 i v e7* e d s \ 1 y .
Tlie cor d w a s c 1 amp ed r
cut
a r id
1i gated .
T h e s e r o n1'« t w i r i w a s f o unil 1 y i rt g i n 11 • e f n o U i n n
position.
Membranes- w e r e rupture/?,. It w a s a f e m a l e fetus and was.
al so del i v e ? e d
eas i 1 y
c o m p 1 e t e h : e e <; 11 e >; t r a <:: t i o n i
m e a n s of
T h e cord w a s c l a m p e d , c u t and li gated and trie p l a c e n t a <was r e m o v e d
m a n u a 11 y .
1 cc. o f P i toe: i n w a s i n joe ted
d i r ec tl y \ ri. t h e u t e r u s .
T h e u t e r i n e lower• -segment incision w a s t h e n
closed
in two l a y e r s
w i t h a c o n t i ri u o i1 s :S 1 C h r o m i c s i \ t»»r e .
R o p e r i t o n e a 1 i 7'«• t i o n w a s a c c o m r«1
with
a
continuous
3--0 C h r o m i c .
nac.h t u b e w a s t h e n g r a s p e d a t ti*e
midportion with a Bah cork.
n l o o p w a s li g a t e d w i t h
an 0 Plain ; t i e

and
a p o r t i o n o f t h e 1 oop w a s e :c i ^ed . s p o n g e , t a p e and need 1 e •coun t
w a s r e p o r t e d a s c o r r e c t and t h e p e r i t o n e u m w a s c l o s e d with c o n t i n u o u s 4
0
Chromic
suture.
The Fascia w a s c l o s e d w i th cent» rn.imjr; :^i y » c ?-y 1 fi
. l o c k i n g e v e r y third s t i t c h .
The subcutaneous
t i ss\»r-s ';w»*rp ^cli^^ef^
w »th . » n t e r r u p ted
Z 0 9} a i n and t h e sk \ n w a s c 1 o s e d w i th .-subcut i c u f ar
U i cry! . T h e pat i ent
t ol or a ted 'the' p r : « m d u r e we"! 1 wi th e r 1 1 mated.
b I ood

-.r.cy.

1o^s

^.s.-- o-.*..;••.. 11V t g

V^7?
R.

a.

rooii;"

v

* ft

go-d

r e n d ; t » c-n .

C~^-^

r.^rirtSTER,

M.o.

RHM/Jg
70
0 : 5-2-0fJ
T : G-?-rf^
LITTLE, ALICE
MR*
R. H. McMASTER, M.D.
5-2-85
OPERATIVE REH(?r<0

A D D E N D U M

D

NAME '

DEPARTMENT OF LABORATORIES
OGOEN. UTAH

MR NO.
REG. NO.
SURGEON

DIRECTOR OP LABORATORIES

PRE-OP. DIAG.

N

°: S
2
DATE
5

LITTLE, ALICE
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Dr. McMaster

AGe

HENRY A. TOTZKE, M.D.
ASSOCIATE PATHOLOGISTS

EUGENE J. L O ^ , M.D.
RAYMOND G. YAWORSKY. M.D.
HISTOLOGICAL EXAMINATION
OF
TISSUE

TISSUE:

PATH. DIAG.

Right and l e f t f a l l o p i a n t u b e .
TWO SEGMENTS OF FALLOPIAN'TUBES
(2)C

GROSS:
The first speimen is labeled "right" and consists of a cylindrical portion of soft
pinkish tan tissue with a length of 1 cm. and a diameter of 8 mm. Portion embedded
The second specimen is labeled "left" and consists of a cylindrical portlonof
soft
pinkish tan tissue with a length of 1 cm. and a diameter of 8 mm. Portion embedded
MICROSCOPIC:
Each of the cylindrical specimensis composed of a completely transected segment
of histologically normal appearing fallopian tube.
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V-,
SIGNED
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A D D E N D U M

E

l i m f ,

ALtCF

KSMcKAY-DEE

STATEftfew¥6^ uftflEtfsTANDING '
AND CONSENT TO STERILIZATION OPERATIONI have ajked f o r ^nd received information concerning s t e r i l i z a t i o n from
D r XY\r ffta.c, LQ A .
a member of the Medical Staff of the McKay-Dee
Hospital Center. I was t o l d that I could decide not to be s t e r i l i z e d . I f I
decide not to be s t e r i l i z e d , rny decision w i l l not a f f e c t my r i g h t to future care
or treatment.
I understand the nature, purpose, e f f e c t s , r i s k s , benefits and a l t e r n a t i v e s
to an operation f o r the purpose of s t e r i l i z a t i o n . I understand that the s t e r i l i z a t i o n must be considered permanent and not r e v e r s i b l e . I have decided t h a t I do
not want to become pregnant or bear c h i l d r e n , but understand that the r e s u l t s from
t h i s procedure cannot be guaranteed.
I was t o l d about those temporary methods of b i r t h control that are available
and could be provided to me which w i l l allow me to bear a c h i l d i n the f u t u r e . I
have rejected these alternatives and chosen to be s t e r i l i z e d .
j
I understand that I W i l l be s t e r i l i z e d by an operation known as R', s&i c c.inO
\Jcd?M(\ .//>?<*-fa**Jh&
discomforts, risks and benefits associated w i t h the
operation hive been explained to me. A l l my questions have been answered to my
satisfaction.
I , AAC'xJ> I
rxiJtdhx o
, hereby consent of my own free w i l l to be
s t e r i l i z e d by ^
n>nir?/\.fr f?
~~
> M - D - and/or associates and assistants
of his/her choice to perform the following operation upon me at the McKay-Dee
Hospital Center ( c i r c l e one) laparoscopic tubal coagulation, pomeroy tubal l i g a t i o n ,
salpingectomy, hu'lka c l i p .

Patient Signature

^JMAMJ

Signature of Witness
(IF AN INTERPRETER IS PROVIDED TO ASSIST THE INDIVIDUAL TO BE STERILIZED)
I have translated the information and advice presented o r a l l y to the i n d i v i d u a l to
be s t e r i l i z e d by the person obtaining this consent. I have also read to
the consent form i n
P _ _ r _ _ ^ _ _ r _ _ language and
explained i t s contents. To the best of my knowledge a n d , b e l i e f , she understood
t h i s explanation.

Interpreter

Form § 686-AB-5/84R-596

Date

A D D E N D U M

F

McKAY-DEE
TiM HOSPITAL CENTER
3939 Morrison Blvd . Ogden. U»on 84409

r,:r.A'T-R.

R~ «

r

t1TY

CONSENT TO OPERATION, ANESTHETICS, AND OTHER MEDICAL SERVICES

^

19

Time

1. I authorize the performance upon p \ x
{
of the following operation Q ~-^Sc. :1 ^ r /wi

y<l-tl0r\.

to be performed under the direction of Dr. a \r \) \ c?.J"T C /)
2. I consent to the performance of operations and procedures, including x-rays,
in addition to or different from those now contemplated, whether or not arising from
presently unforeseen conditions, which the above-named doctor or his associates or
assistants may consider necessary or advisable in the course of the operation.
3. I consent to the administration of such anesthetics as may be considered
necessary or advisable by the physician responsible for this service.
4. For the purpose of advancing medical education, I consent to the admittance
of medical personnel to the operating room.
5. The nature and purpose of the operation, possible alternative methods of
treatment, the risks involved, and the possibility of complications have been fully
explained to me. No guarantee or assurance has been given by anyone as to the
results that may be obtained.
6. I consent to the dxamination of any tissues or parts which may be removed
from my body by the hospital authorities and further consent to the disposal of such
tissues and parts by the hospital authorities.

Signed

Witness:

P.M.

/•fa Jrf/f
Relationship to Patient

A D D E N D U M

G

MARY C. CORPORON #734
Attorney for Plaintiff
CORPORON & WILLIAMS
Suite 1100 - Boston Building
#9 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
(801) 328-1162

IN IHE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH.

ALICE LITTLE,

PLAINTIFF'S ANSWERS TO DEFENDANT
R. H. McMASTER'S FIRST SET OF
INTERROGATORIES

Plaintiff,
-vsR. H. McMASTERS and McKAY-DEE
HOSPITAL,

Civil No. CV-221988

Defendants.

COMES
counsel,

NOW

and

THE

PLAINTIFF

to

the above-entitled action, by and through

hereby responds to and answers Defendant R. H. McMaster's First

Set of Interrogatories to Plaintiff, as follows:
INTERROGATORY NO. 1:
State your full name, address and birthdate.
ANSWER:
Alice Louise Little, P. 0. Box 393, Whitefish, Montana, b o m 3/29/58.
INTERROATORY NO. 2:
What is your marital status?
ANSWER:
Married.

Plaintiff

has

not

determined

at this time what other witnesses may or

will be called to testify on her behalf. At such as this information has been
determined, plaintiff will amend her answers accordingly.
INTERROGATORY NO. 22:
Identify
witness

at

each

person

trial.

you

or your attorney expect to call as an expert

With respect to each person, state their present address

and

telephone number, the subject matter on which each is expeted to tesfify,

and

the substance of the facts and opinions on which the exper is expected to

testify as grounds for each opinion.
ANSWER:
See Answer to Interrogatory No. 21, above.
INTERROGATORY NO. 23:
Do
income

you
as

anmswer

contend

a

is

that

result
"yes,"

of

you
the

please

have suffered any loss of wages, earnings or

alleged

misconduct of this defendant?

If the

indicate the precise amount which you contend has

been lost to the date of your answers to these Interrogatories.
ANSWER:
Yes.

I contend

that

I have lost the opportunity to earn wages since

approximately eleven weeks into my fourth pregnancy for reason that the burden
of

caring

for

complications
have

four

children four years of age and younger and the physical

of my last pregnancy have made it impossible for me to work.

I

therefore lost at least minimum wages from at least part-time employment

since June 1986.
INTERROGATORY NO. 24:
Does
contract
plaintiff

plaintiff
or

allege

assurance

in writing

that

defendant

made

any

guarantee, warranty,

of

result to be obtained concerning the treatment of

and

signed by defendant or an authorized agent of the

8

defendant?
Request

If the answer is "yes," and plaintiff will do so without a formal

for

Production of Documents, please attach a copy of said guarantee,

warranty or contract of assurance.
ANSWER:
No,

plaintiff

warranty,

contract

does not
or

allege

assurance

of

that

defendants made

result

any guarantee,

to be obtained concerning the

treatment, in writing.
INTERROGATORY NO. 25:
State

the

date of birth of the child born subsequent to the May 2, 1985

tubal ligation performed on you.
ANSWER:
September 23, 1986.
INTERROGATORY NO. 26:
In

Paragraph

9 of

your Complaint, you state that you "discovered this

pregnancy in approximately March 1986."

State the details of when and how you

discovered this pregnancy.
ANSWER:
Plaintiff

had

a

pregnancy

test performed in approximately March 1986,

which confirmed her pregnancy.
INTERROGATORY NO. 27:
On

what

performed

on

factual basis do you rely in contending that the tubal ligation
you on May 2, 1985 "did not work" as alleged in Paragraph 10 of

your Complaint?
ANSWER:
Plaintiff

was

advised

by

the defendant, Dr. McMaster, that the tubal

ligation

performed by him on May 2, 1985 would prevent her from ever becoming

pregnant

again.

In fact, he counseled with plaintiff that she should be very

9

STATE OF MMEANA

)

COUNTY Q^^CaZA^^

)

ALICE

LITTLE, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and states as

follows:

She is the plaintiff to the above-entitled action, she has read the

foregoing

Plaintiff's Answers

Interogatories,

including

to Defendant

R. H. McMaster's First Set of

all attachments, and understands

the contents

thereof and the same is true of her own personal knowledge.

hj,~

Atffo

ALICE LITTLE
Plaintiff
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me by Alice Little this ^ 1

day of

August, 1988.

(fS*NT\Q,.
NOTARY PUBLIC
.
~^U#-V^£iOx5L
County
Residing a t (/QVy
ppl W J J O I S t a t e of Montana
My commission expires:

CLvcy („

{\qqq
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A D D E N D U M

I

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
* * *

ALICE LITTLE,
DEPOSITION OF:

Plaintiff,
vs.

ALICE LITTLE

R. H. McMASTERS and McKAY
DEE HOSPITAL,

Civil No. CV-221988

Defendants.
* * *

BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 11th day of January,
1989, the deposition of ALICE LITTLE, produced as a witness
herein at the instance of the defendants herein, in the
above-entitled action now pending in the above-named court,
was taken before VIKI E. HATTON, a Certified Shorthand
Reporter and Notary Public in and for the State of Utah,
commencing at the hour of 10:00 a.m. of said day at the
offices of RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON, 50 South Main
Street, Salt Lake City, Utah.
That said deposition was taken pursuant to notice,

Associated Professional Reporters

22
A

1

I just took it it was the cesarean and the tubal.

2

You know, the tubal was underneath it, and I knew I was going

3

to have the tubal anyway, I knew I was going to have the

4

tubal, I didn't want any more kids.

5

Q

You consented to the tubal, didn't you?

6

A

Yes.
(Whereupon, Exhibit No. 1
was marked
for identification.)

7
8
9

Q

(BY MR. STOTT)

Mrs. Little, showing you a document

10

that has been marked as Exhibit 1, it has as a heading,

11

"Statement of Understanding of Consent to Sterilization

12

Operation" on the stationery of McKay Dee Hospital Center.

13

I'll ask you to look at that and tell me if your signature

14

appears on that copy?

15

A

Yes, it does.

16

Q

And does it appear on the line where it says

17

"patient signature"?

18

A

Yes.

19

Q

There's a signature underneath yours where it says

20

"signature of witness."
A

21
22

a J.

Berry.

What is that name?

I can't read —

I don't know if it's a T or

I don't know what the first letter is.

23

Q

Do you know that person?

24

A

Not by last name.

25

Q

Do you know the person who signed this as witness on

23
it?
A

Judy is the one that had me sign it.

But I don't

know what her last name was.
Q

Does your writing appear on that document in any

other place?
A

Yes, right here (indicating).

Q

Tell me what that says.

A

Yes.

Q

None of that is yours?

A

Just this (indicating).

Q

The only writing that's yours on this document is

Does it say Alice Little?

No/ this is not my writing.

your signature?
A

Yes.

Q

Nowf the document at the top has a blank where Dr.

McMasters1 name is written in, doesn't it?
A

Yes.

Q

And then two paragraphs above your signature, there

is a statement which says and I quote, "I understand that I
will be sterilized by an operation known as bilateral tubal
ligation."

Those words are written in, aren't they?

A

Yes.

Q

Do you see that?

A

Yes.

Q

Were those words written in those blanks before you

signed that document?

32
1

tubes being tied or cut; is that correct?

2

A

Yes.

3

Q

Is it your testimony here today that your

4

understanding was that if you had your tubes tied or your

5

tubes cut, that you could not get pregnant again?

6

A

Yes.

7

Q

No way you could get pregnant again once your tubes

8

were cut?

Was that your understanding?

9

A

Yes.

I —

nothing.

10

Q

Ycu what?

11

A

I just thought —

I had my husband talked into it.

12

To be double sure, because in Evanston, a lot of people were

13

getting pregnant and having their tubes cut, so I was going to

14

have my husband fixed to be sure.
Q

15
16

tubes cut and then they got pregnant?
A

17
18

Did you have friends, girlfriends who had had their

No, just —

I heard of a case in Evanston where a

lady got pregnant after her tubes were cut for five years.
Q

Did you hear about that before your tubes had been

21

A

Yes.

22

Q

Did you ever discuss that fact with Dr. McMasters?

23

A

No.

24

Q

Did you ever raise that with him, tell him what

19
20

25

cut?

you'd heard?

33
No, I just told him I wanted my husband to get fixed

A

so we cou Id be double protected.
Q

You told us about that meeting, didn't you?

A

Yes.

Q

Did you have acquaintances or family members who had

had their tubes cut or tied and then subsequently got
pregnant?
A

No.

Q

Do you know of anybody personally who that happened

A

No.

Q

But you had heard in Evanston before you had your

to?

tubes cut of ladies that had gotten pregnant after their tubes
had been cut?
A

Of a lady, yes.

Q

A lady?

A

Yes.

Q

So you knew it could happen, didn't you?

A

I was scared that it could happen.

Q

It was your understanding before you had your tubes

cut that —

you were aware that pregnancy could happen, even

though your tubes had been cut; correct?
A

I was scared that my chances -- that it was a

possibili ty.
Q

Did you or your husband ever use any type of birth

72
1

and when I went to surgery/ she was with me.

2

McMasters, they came in together.

3

MR. ERICKSON:

4

7
8

The hospital doesn't have any further

questions.

5
6

And Dr.

FURTHER EXAMINATION
BY MR. STOTTr
Q

Mrs. Little, looking at Exhibit 1, if you would, if

you had been told that the information —

9

let me back up.

If Dr. McMasters had told you that the results from

10

the procedure could not be guaranteed, as stated in Exhibit 1,

11

would you still have wanted the tubal ligation?

12

A

13

fixed.

Yes, but I would have went on and had my husband

14

MR. STOTT:

15

(Deposition concluded at 11:55 a.m.)

16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

That's all.

A D D E N D U M
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MARY C. CORPORON #7 34
Attorney for Plaintiff
CORPORON & WILLIAMS
Suite 1100 - Boston Building
#9 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
(801) 328-1162

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH.
ALICE LITTLE,
Plaintiff,

AFFIDAVIT OF DR. STEVEN R. SHIRTS

-vsR. H. McMASTER and McKAY
DEE HOSPITAL,

Civil No. CV-221988

Defendants.

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)
: ss.
)

I, DR. STEVEN R. SHIRTS, being first duly sworn upon oath,
deposes and states as follows:
1.

I am a physician duly licensed to practice medicine in

the State of Utah and am practicing in Salt Lake County, State of
Utah.

I have hospital privileges at Pioneer Valley Hospital and

practice exclusively in the field of obstetrics and gynecology.
I am board certified with the American Board of Obstetrics and
Gynecology.
2.
the

I have reviewed the medical records of the plaintiff to

above-captioned

matter,

Alice

Little,

pertaining

to

her

pregnancy which resulted in the birth of twins on May 2, 1985.

In that pregnancy she was assisted by the defendant above-named,
Dr. R. H. McMaster.
tubal

ligation

The delivery by Caesarean Section and a

were

performed

by

Dr.

R.

H.

McMaster

at

the

defendant McKay Dee Hospital.
3.

I have

reviewed

the document entitled

"Statement of

Understanding and Consent to Sterilization Operation" signed by
Alice Little, which is undated.

A true and correct copy of this

statement is attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference
as "Exhibit A."
4.

In my

opinion, the

"Statement

of

Understanding

and

Consent to Sterilization Operation" would be and is unclear to
the average layman, in that it states that the operation "must be
considered permanent and not reversible
also

states

that

guaranteed."

the

results

from

. . .", but in that it

this

procedure

"cannot

be

In my opinion, the phrase and statement that the

result of this procedure

"cannot be guaranteed" is not adequate

to

that

inform

the

patient

she

may

become

pregnant

after

performance of this procedure.
5.
Little

In my opinion, the statistical probability that Alice
would

ligation,

become

pregnant

performed

immediately

approximately 1 in 125.
permanent

after

performance

of

post-Caesarean,

a

tubal

would

be

These odds would increase, in favor of

sterilization,

to

approximately

1

in

3 0 0 " if

sterilization were performed six weeks or more post-delivery.

In

my opinion, any patient contemplating a tubal ligation should be
informed

of

those

options

and

statistics

and

the

risks

of

becoming pregnant in spite of the surgery.
6.

Any

patient

consenting

to
2

any

surgery,

including

a

sterilization operation post-Caesarean, as was done in this case,
should

be

requested

to

sign

a statement of understanding

and

consent to sterilization before any type of anesthesia or preoperative medication is administered.

If Alice Little signed the

"Statement

Consent

of

Understanding

and

to

Sterilization

Operation" after receiving any kind of narcotic within the one or
two hours prior, then she would not have been competent to sign a
consent to the surgery, even though she may have been conscious.
7.

In my review of the medical records, I did not note any

indication that Dr. McMaster had taken the time to discuss the
risks of the performance of the sterilization procedure with his
patient, Alice

Little, including

the

risk

that she may still

become pregnant, either in his records and notes of office visits
with Alice Little, in the hospital prior to the surgeries or at
any time prior to the performance of the tubal ligation.
8.

In my opinion, the defendant, McKay Dee Hospital, is

also responsible to advise its surgery patients of substantial
and significant risks which may result from surgery performed in
their hospital.

In my opinion, the risk of becoming pregnant

after performance of tubal ligation surgery is a substantial and
significant

risk.

It

appears

that

the

obtaining

of

Alice

Little's signature on the "consent" was done at the last minute.
The form is undated and untimed, and it is not even completely
filled

in, in that

the patient

apparently

did not understand

exactly what procedure was about to be performed on her because
she

did

not

cirle

the appropriate

procedure where

indicated.

Therefore, I question whether Alice Little was given time to read
the form prior to signing it, nor do I believe that she had an
3

understanding of the procedure to be performed.

I question if

the person obtaining her signature took the time to explain to
her what

she was signing.

securing

the signature

Certainly, the hospital employee
did not have

the form

completed

satisfactorily.
9.

In my opinion, the defendants, R. H. McMaster and McKay

Dee Hospital, fell below the standard of care of physicians
practicing in the State of Utah and/or hospitals in the State of
Utah in their treatment of Alice Little, in failing to advise
Alice

Little

of substantial

and serious risks

of her tubal

ligation surgery performed in 1985, in failing to clearly advise
her that she might become pregnant after the surgery.

/4u~ CI. y£i>L

AN-5*

DR. STEVEN R. SHIRTS
Affiant
ON THE

;V

day of April, 1989, personally appeared before

me, the undersigned notary, Dr. Steven R. Shirts, the signer of
the foregoing Affidavit, who duly acknowledged to me that he
signed the same voluntarily and for its stated purpose.

A.. 7 'U\;A '-^

rfjf/f):f>'^s
: I

NOTARY PUBLIC
Residing at Salt Lake County
My Commission Expires:

4

